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Insurance
by Stephen M. Schatz*
Stephen L. Cotter"
and Bradley S. Wolff*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Across the board, courts strictly applied insurance contracts as they
were written. Typical of this survey year, insureds went zero for five in
attempts to escape from their responsibility to read their policies. Public
policy arguments did not seem to work. At the end of the survey year,
the Georgia Court of Appeals further clarified the application of
coverages in complex areas of insurance for "advertising injury" and
"construction defects."
II.

HOMEOWNER'S INSURANCE

Those responsible for a passenger death resulting from a motorbike's
operation off their property could not obtain liability coverage from any
one of three carriers in Harkins v. ProgressiveGulf Insurance Co.1 The
court of appeals rejected an intriguing and sophisticated interpretation
of Progressive's automobile policy language regarding "an insured,"

* Partner in the firm of Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Atlanta, Georgia. University
of Virginia (B.A., with distinction, 1985); University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
School of Law (J.D., 1988). Member, State Bar of Georgia (Member, Tort and Insurance
Practice and Litigation); Defense Research Institute.
** Partner in the firm of Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Atlanta, Georgia. Mercer
University (B.A., 1971); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum
laude, 1974). Member, Mercer Law Review (1973-1974). Member, State Bar of Georgia;
American Bar Association; Georgia Defense Lawyers Association; Defense Research
Institute; International Association of Defense Counsel.
*** Partner in the firm of Swift, Currie, McGhee & Hiers, Atlanta, Georgia. Vanderbilt
University (B.A., cum laude, 1983); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., cum laude,
1986). Member, State Bar of Georgia; Defense Research Institute; International
Association of Defense Counsel.
1. 262 Ga. App. 559, 586 S.E.2d 1 (2003).
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holding that the court should effectuate each provision of the policy and
interpret the policy in a way that harmonizes the provisions.' With
respect to Mr. Harkins, he received no coverage because he was not
operating the vehicle.3 Likewise, with respect to Great Northern's
homeowner's policy in favor of Larry Harkins, the court of appeals
rejected the argument that the clear "motorized land vehicle" exclusion
would yield when there was an alternative "covered" theory of liability,
such as negligent supervision.4
Distinguishing Guaranty National Insurance Co. v. Brock,' wherein
the enforcement of an exclusion would have deprived the policyholder of
all coverage, thereby defeating the underlying purpose of that policy, the
court in Harkins explained that the Great Northern policy afforded
coverage for such motorized land vehicles in a variety of circumstances,
including while the vehicle was in storage and while the vehicle was
used on the resident's premises.6 Hence, enforcement of the motorized
land vehicle exclusion7 did not frustrate the purpose of the policy.8 The
court of appeals further held, under the Federal Insurance Company's
("Federal") excess liability policy,9 that a "motor bike" was a "motorcycle" in the face of an argument that a motorcycle, for licensure purposes,
would have certain safety equipment that was not on this motor bike.10
The Federal policy did not adopt the motorcycle definitions found in
Georgia licensure law.1' Finally, the court declined to read out the
requirement in Barbara Harkins's USAA automobile policy, that the
involved vehicle be a covered automobile. 12 A valiant effort was made
on behalf of Harkins, but the court did not accept Harkins's arguments.13

Several Georgia appellate decisions dealt with public policy arguments, rejecting them in the context of the cases in which they arose.
In Manning v. USF&G,'14 a case of first impression, Georgia deter-

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Id. at 561, 586 S.E.2d at 6.
Id.
Id. at 562, 586 S.E.2d at 4.
222 Ga. App. 294, 474 S.E.2d 46 (1996).
Harkins, 262 Ga. App. at 561, 586 S.E.2d at 3.
Id.
Id. at 563, 586 S.E.2d at 1.
Id., 586 S.E.2d at 4.
Id., 586 S.E.2d at 5.
Id., 586 S.E.2d at 4-5.
Id. at 564, 586 S.E.2d at 5.
Id.
264 Ga. App. 102, 589 S.E.2d 687 (2003).
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mined, along with the majority of states,1" that a homeowner's policy
excluding events "arising out of the use of a motor vehicle" excludes
coverage even when an alternative theory of liability existed, for
6
example, dramshop liability, which was not explicitly excluded.' The
court noted that Georgia courts had repeatedly rejected the "concurrent
cause" analysis"7 urged in this context in decisions such as Dynamic
8
CleaningService, Inc. v. First FinancialInsurance Co." By the policy's
express terms, which the court would enforce as unambiguous, the
exclusion focused on "'the genesis of [the client's] claims-if those claims
arose out of [that partner's] culpable conduct.., coverage need not be
provided.' 19
In Baldwin v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,20 the court of appeals,
honoring freedom of contract and public policy interests, rejected an
attempt to read out of the policy the "resident of the household"
2
exclusion located in the homeowner's policy. ' The mother of the
deceased, who was also the defendant's former spouse, sought to recover
for the wrongful death of her son due to an accident at defendant
father's home. The mother argued that the standard resident of the
household exclusion in a homeowner's policy should not be enforced on
the grounds of public policy. She drew support from GEICO v.
The
Dickey,22 a compulsory automobile liability insurance decision.'
public
of
expression
similar
court in Baldwin held that there was no
24
The court declined to
policy with respect to homeowner's insurance.
parties are left free
"the
that
extend the trump of public policy, noting
.... 25 Such a
in
coverage
gaps
to contract in a manner that leaves
similar public
to
reject
trend
national
the
decision is consistent with

15. David B. Harrison, Annotation, Construction and Effect of Provision Excluding
Liability For Automobile-Related Injuries or Damage from Coverage of Homeowner's or
PersonalLiabilityPolicy, 6 ALR 4th 555 (2004) (including neighboring Alabama, Alfa Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Jones, 555 So. 2d 77 (Ala. 1989), and Florida, Am. Sur. & Cas. Co. v. Lake
Jackson Pizza, Inc., 788 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 2001)).
16. Manning, 264 Ga. App. at 103, 589 S.E.2d at 688.
17. Id. at 104, 589 S.E.2d at 689.
18. 208 Ga. App. 37, 38, 430 S.E.2d 33, 34 (1993).
19. Manning, 264 Ga. App. at 106, 589 S.E.2d at 690.
20. 264 Ga. App. 229, 590 S.E.2d 206 (2003).
21. Id. at 231, 590 S.E.2d at 208.
22. 255 Ga. 661, 340 S.E.2d 596 (1986).
23. Baldwin, 264 Ga. App. at 231, 590 S.E.2d at 208.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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policy arguments outside the context of when they truly apply, compulsory automobile insurance. 5
In Maclntyre & Edwards, Inc. v. Rich,27 a decision concerning the
duty to read, the court refused to excuse an insured's failure to examine
a renewal policy that did not contain unlimited replacement cost
coverage, but imposed new specific limits on coverage.2 ' The insured
argued that the exception to the duty to read, established by Wright
Body Works v. Columbus Interstate Insurance Agency,29 which involved
a co-insurance clause, did not apply when the change was readily
apparent, plain, and unambiguous. Additionally, there was no showing

26. Six jurisdictions have considered striking the Household Exclusion from a
homeowner's policy; all six rejected it, each specifically distinguishing between homeowner's and auto liability policies. Roberts v. Farmers Ins. Co., 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS
30483 (10th Cir. 1999) (affirming summary judgment based on Household Exclusion in
homeowner's policy because "Itihe logic of [striking the household exclusion from a
homeowners policy] does not apply here because Oklahoma has not mandated the purchase
of homeowner's insurance"); Groff v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 646 F. Supp. 973 (E.D.
Pa. 1986) (rejecting insured's argument that household exclusion is "contrary to public
policy" as "puzzling" because "I am unaware of any public policy interests which would be
served by mandating insurance of parents against personal injury claims brought by their
minor children"); Salviejo v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 958 P.2d 552, 553 (Haw. Ct. App.
1998) (affirming summary judgment for insurer, refusing to strike household exclusion:
"Although similar exclusions in automobile insurance policies have been invalidated, the
cases which so hold have relied upon public policies expressed in statutes regulating
automobile insurance ... we have not been referred to any similar public policy basis for
invalidating this type of exclusion in a homeowner's policy"); Saltzman v. Broussard, 736
So. 2d 243 (La. Ct. App. 1999); Suba v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 498 N.Y.S.2d 656 (App.
Div. 1986); Neil v. Allstate Ins. Co., 549 A.2d 1304, 1307 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (specifying
that cases voiding Household Exclusion from auto policies are "not analogous" to cases
involving homeowner's policies).
All jurisdictions that considered the validity of the household exclusion in a homeowner's
policy have enforced it. No jurisdictions found it per se against public policy. See, e.g., St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Warren, 87 F. Supp. 2d 904 (E.D. Mo. 1999); Mitroff v.
United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 72 Cal. App. 4th 1230 (Ct. App. 1999) ("The concept of a
household exclusion is a common one which has long enjoyed judicial support."); Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Brettman, 657 N.E.2d 70 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (enforcing household exclusion in
homeowner's policy); Vierkant by Johnson v. AMCO Ins. Co., 543 N.W.2d 117 (Minn. 1996)
(enforcing household exclusion in homeowner's policy); American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Ryan, 330 N.W.2d 113 (Minn. 1983); Foley v. Foley, 414 A.2d 34, 35 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
1980) (enforcing household exclusion in homeowner's policy); State Farm General Ins. Co.
v. Emerson, 687 P.2d 1139, 1143 (Wash. 1984) (enforcing household exclusion in
homeowner's policy); Rich v. Allstate Ins. Co., 445 S.E.2d 249 (W. Va. 1994) (enforcing
household exclusion in homeowner's policy); Rabas v. Claim Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 556 N.W.2d
410 (Wis. 1996), review dismissed, 560 N.W.2d 278 (Wis. 1996).
27. 267 Ga. App. 78, 599 S.E.2d 15 (2004).
28. Id. at 79-80, 599 S.E.2d at 17.
29. 233 Ga. 268, 271, 210 S.E.2d 801, 803-04 (1974).
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of reliance on the agent's expertise to minutely examine the nuances of
such a policy.3" While the rule in Wright Body Works imposes responsibility on an agent for minute examination of nuances of coverage, the
court in MacIntyre properly held that the exception to the duty to read
would not be expanded to eliminate the duty to read most normally
31
encountered and understandable insurance terms.
32
In Tripp v. Allstate Insurance, the court enforced the "intentional
act" exclusion,33 employed by Allstate in its standard form policies, in
Georgia and elsewhere. 34 Tomlinson, putative insured, admitted that
he intended to buy marijuana and was holding a pistol grip twelve-gauge
shotgun in his hand when he walked in the restaurant's back door. He
also claimed he did not know the gun was loaded, it discharged
35
accidentally, and he lacked the subjective intent to harm anyone.
This type of scenario is often repeated when a tortfeasor seeks coverage
despite an intentional act exclusion.36 Allstate's policies provide for
exclusion stating: "We do not cover any bodily injury or property
damage intended by or which may reasonably be expected to result from
the intentional acts or omissions of any insured person which are crimes
"37

The court reviewed numerous opinions of other states involving
identical Allstate policy language, determining that the courts generally
upheld this exclusion as a matter of law." The Georgia court in Tripp
followed, affirming summary judgment and concluding that one "who
holds a shotgun in his arms for intimidation or perceived personal need
for protection-loaded or unloaded-must anticipate that some bodily
injury is likely to result to somebody."39 Though the Allstate policy
language is a bit stronger for the carrier, the court's decision is
consistent with the Georgia Supreme Court's teaching in Roe v. State
Farm.4 ° The court has limited patience and tolerance for incredulous
assertions apparently made only for purposes of obtaining coverage.

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
matter

MacIntyre, 267 Ga. App. at 81-82, 599 S.E.2d at 18.
Id. at 82, 599 S.E.2d at 18.
262 Ga. App. 93, 584 S.E.2d 692 (2003).
Id. at 95, 584 S.E.2d at 692.
Id.
Id. at 94, 584 S.E.2d at 694.
Id. at 95, 584 S.E.2d at 694.
Id.
Id. at 96, 584 S.E.2d at 695.
Id.
259 Ga. 42, 376 S.E.2d 876 (1989) (applying the intentional act exclusion, as a
of law, to deny child molestation).
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COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY INSURANCE

A.

Coverage for "AdvertisingInjury"
Unsolicited facsimiles sent in violation of a consumer protection
statute, which violate the recipient's right of privacy, constitute covered
"advertising injury" under the standard commercial general liability
("CGL") policy.4 ' In Hooters of Augusta, Inc. v. American Global
Insurance Co.,42 Hooters sought to recover damages from its excess
commercial liability carriers for their denial of coverage for a judgment
against Hooters arising out of unsolicited fax advertisements it had sent
to Georgia business owners' fax machines. In the judgment the court
determined Hooters violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
("TCPA) 4 3 and held Hooters liable for treble damages."
The policies provided coverage for "advertising injury," which was
defined as "injury arising solely out of [the insured's] advertising
activities as a result of... [o]ral or written publication of material that
violates a person's right of privacy... . 5 In determining whether the

TCPA violation constituted an "advertising injury," the court used the
following three-prong test: (1) whether the alleged conduct constitutes
an "advertising injury" within the meaning of the insurance policy; (2)
if so, whether the insured engaged in advertising activity; and (3) if so,
whether a "causal connection" existed between the advertising activity
In affirming that the alleged conduct
and the resulting injury."
satisfied all three prongs of the test, the court held that the facsimiles
were sent as part of Hooters' advertising activity and did violate the
recipients' "right of privacy."4" Because "right of privacy" was not
defined by the policy, the court interpreted the phrase according to its
common usage to mean "freedom from an unauthorized intrusion" or the
"right to be let alone."48 The court rejected the insurers' contention

41. Hooters of Augusta, Inc. v. Am. Global Ins. Co., 272 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1371 (S.D.
Ga. 2003).
42. 272 F. Supp. 2d 1365 (S.D. Ga. 2003).
43. 47 U.S.C.A. § 227 (West 2001). The TCPA makes it "unlawful for any person within
the United States ...to use any telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device
to send unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine... ." Id. § 227(b)(1)(C).

44. Hooters, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 1375.
45. Id. at 1371.
46. Id. (citing Hyman v. Nat'l Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 304 F.3d 1179 (11th Cir. 2002)).
47. Id. at 1371, 1373.
48. Id. at 1372. It must be noted, however, that the underlying complaint against
Hooters did not allege any cause of action for invasion of the right of privacy, and the jury
did not address such issue in the underlying action. Moreover, plaintiffs in the underlying

20041
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that "right of privacy" refers to torts constituting an "invasion of privacy"
and, instead, adopted the common understanding of the phrase. 49 The
court then determined that the requisite "causal connection" existed
because the advertising itself caused the injury for which coverage was
sought; that is, the sending of the facsimiles caused the invasion of the
recipients' right of privacy.' °
To avoid coverage, the insurers relied heavily upon an exclusion in
their policy that stated "no coverage is provided for an [aidvertising
injury ... [airising out of the willful violation of a penal statute or
ordinance committed by or with the consent of the [i]nsured." 1 The
insurers argued that the exclusion applied to prevent coverage because
Hooters had been assessed treble damages for willful violation of the
TCPA.52 In rejecting such arguments, the court used the following
three-part test, established by the Eleventh Circuit in United States v.
NEC Corp.,13 to determine whether a statute is penal, as opposed to
remedial in nature: (1) whether the purpose of the statute is to redress
individual wrongs, or more general wrongs to the public; (2) whether
recovery under the statute should be given to the harmed individual or
the public; and (3) whether the recovery authorized by the statute is
wholly disproportionate to the harm suffered.54 The court concluded
that the TCPA was remedial for the following reasons: (1) the purpose
of the TCPA is to redress harms to individuals who are forced to incur
the costs associated with receiving unsolicited faxes; (2) the damages
provided by the TCPA are issued to the recipient of the faxes, and not
to the public; and (3) precedential case law indicates that disproportionate statutory damages and even multiplied damages do not necessarily
make a statute penal.55

action could not, as a matter of law, have a viable claim for invasion of privacy under
Georgia law. See, e.g., Cabaniss v. Hisley, 114 Ga. App. 367, 151 S.E.2d 496 (1966); Davis
v. Gen. Fin. & Thrift Corp., 80 Ga. App. 708, 57 S.E.2d 225 (1950). Thus, the court
appears to have read into the TCPA a tort of invasion of privacy where none would
otherwise exist under Georgia law. The court's decision is contrary to decisions in other
jurisdictions holding that torts identified under the "advertising injury" clause of a liability
policy must be read in their common law context and that coverage extends only for
common law tort claims and not statutory enactments that may indirectly redress such
conduct. See, e.g., Bank of the West v. Super. Ct., 833 P.2d 545 (Cal. 1992).
49. Hooters, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 1372.
50. Id. at 1374.
51. Id. at 1375.
52. Id. at 1374-75.
53. 11 F.3d 136 (11th Cir. 1993).
54. Hooters, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 1375.
55. Id. at 1375-76. Contra Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Drury, 213 Ga. App. 321, 445
S.E.2d 272 (1994) (holding that an insured's violation of a criminal statute constitutes a
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Finally, the court rejected the insurers' contention that the treble
damages award against Hooters, under the TCPA, constituted an award
of punitive damages, which was not covered under the policy.5 6

In

doing so the court relied upon the well established Georgia law, as set
forth in Lunceford v. Peachtree Casualty Insurance Co., 7 that if the
underlying cause of action, upon which punitive damages are assessed,
is covered under the insurance policy, then the punitive damages are
likewise covered, absent an explicit exclusion to the contrary.5 8
Hooters illustrates how technological advances in advertisement, such
as faxes and internet spam, may be interpreted by courts to constitute
covered "advertising injury." To the extent such advertisements violate
consumer protection acts, they will not be excluded from coverage as a
violation of a penal statute. Moreover, Hooters may open the door for
more insureds to seek coverage for an alleged violation of a consumer
protection act, under the definition of "advertising injury," when the act
prohibits an invasion of privacy, even when the claimant does not
specifically allege any common law tort for invasion of privacy against
the insured.
Interpretationof "Occurrence"in ConstructionDefect Claims
Damages allegedly resulting from a contractor or subcontractor's
defective construction work do not constitute an "occurrence" and are not
covered under a CGL policy when the contractor or subcontractor
intended the work to be done. In Owners Insurance Co. v. James,59 the
insurer sought a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defend or
indemnify its insured subcontractor under the policy for claims of
defective application of synthetic stucco cladding ("EIFS") on a residence.
The claims against the subcontractor included theories of breach of
contract, breach of warranty, and negligence for damage to the EIFS and
resulting water penetration behind the EIFS to other portions of the
home.6 ° The CGL policy provided that the insurance would only apply
to property damage if the property damage was caused by an "occurrence.""' The policy defined occurrence as "an accident, including
B.

willful violation of a penal statute, which is excluded under an insurance policy).

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Hooters, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 1377.
230 Ga. App. 4, 5, 495 S.E.2d 88, 89 (1997).
Hooters, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 1377.
295 F. Supp. 2d 1354 (N.D. Ga. 2003).
Id. at 1357.
Id. at 1363.
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continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general
harmful conditions."62
The court held that the insurer did not have the duty to defend or
indemnify its insured because the alleged conduct was not an "accident"
The court's holding relied on
and, therefore, not an occurrence.'
Georgia case law, which construed "accident" to mean "an unintended
happening rather than one occurring through intention or design."'
In other words, when an act is intentional, it cannot constitute an
accident as that term is applied in an insurance policy. Because the
insured actually installed the EIFS at the residence, rather than
subcontract the work to another, such installation was an intended act
and not an accident; therefore, any damage allegedly resulting from that
work was not covered under the policy.6 5
The court rejected the homeowner's argument that coverage should
apply because, while the subcontractor may have intended his acts, he
did not intend the consequences of his acts, such as causing water to
penetrate the EIFS, which resulted in damage to other parts of the
home.6" Georgia courts have construed CGL policies to "cover only
injury resultingfrom accidental acts and not injury accidentallycaused
by intentional acts."67 Because the subcontractor's act of installing the
EIFS, which caused the alleged injury, was intentional, the alleged
injury was not covered by the policy.6'
Owners has the potential to tremendously impact the Georgia
insurance industry for those insurers who write CGL policies for
contractors and subcontractors. In the past insurers assumed that as
long as negligence was alleged against their insureds, the alleged

62. Id.
63. Id. at 1364-65.
64. Id. at 1363 (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Grayes, 216 Ga. App. 419, 421, 454 S.E.2d
616, 618 (1995); Thrif-Mart, Inc. v. Commercial Union Assurance Cos., 154 Ga. App. 344,
346, 268 S.E.2d 397, 400 (1980)).

65. Id. at 1363-64.
66. Id. at 1364.
67. Id. (italics in original). See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Grayes, 216 Ga. App. 419, 421,
454 S.E.2d 616, 618-19 (1995); Winters v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 209 Ga. App.
369,370,433 S.E.2d 363,363-64 (1993); Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Meriwether,
169 Ga. App. 363, 363, 312 S.E.2d 823, 823-24 (1983).
68. 295 F. Supp. 2d at 1364-65. At the time of publication of this Article, the Georgia
Court of Appeals had recently issued SawHorse, Inc. v. Southern GuarantyInsurance Co.
of Georgia, No. A04A1232, 2004 WL 1700478 (Ga. App. July 30, 2004). Although decided
after the period of time covered by this survey, the case does suggest that Georgia courts
are resistant to find lack of occurrence when the policy provides coverage for the risk that
defective or faulty workmanship will cause injury to people or damage to other property.
A full treatment of this case will be included in next year's survey.
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improper construction constituted an occurrence under the policy.
Instead, insurers have focused on whether the alleged "property damage"
fell within one of the "business risks" exclusions. Now, before even
considering the application of the business risks exclusions, carriers will
first seek to determine whether their insureds' alleged conduct in
constructing the property was an intentional act and, therefore, not
covered. When insured builders actually perform construction acts,
rather than subcontract them, insurers may take a much more
aggressive stance in denying any coverage for damages arising out of the
defective construction.
C.

Interpretationof "Occurrence"in Breach of Contract Claims

If the allegations of the complaint include intentional conduct arising
out of a breach of contract, such allegations do not constitute an
occurrence and no coverage is afforded under the CGL policy, even if the
allegations also include theories of negligence.69 In Georgia Farm
Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v.Hall County,"0 the insured owned real
property subject to a condemnation petition filed by Hall County.
Thereafter, the insured contracted with the injured party, a timber
removal company, to sell timber on the property subject to a condemnation petition. After Hall County obtained the condemnation judgment,
the injured party removed the timber, causing Hall County to sue the
injured party for trespass and conversion. The injured party then
brought a third-party complaint against the insured that sought
indemnification, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, ordinary and
gross negligence, and punitive damages for failing to advise the injured
party of the existence of the condemnation petition."1
The court held that the CGL insurer had no duty to defend or
indemnify the insured for the third-party complaint brought against the
insured because such alleged conduct was not a covered occurrence."2
Occurrence was defined by the policy as an accident, which in Georgia
means "an event which takes place without one's foresight or expectation
or design."" Even though the third-party complaint alleged negligence
and gross negligence, in addition to breach of contract, the court held
that the "only reasonable inference to be drawn from the alleged facts"

69. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hall County, 262 Ga. App. 810, 813, 586
S.E.2d 715, 718 (2003).
70. 262 Ga. App. 810, 586 S.E.2d 715 (2003).
71. Id. at 811, 586 S.E.2d at 716.
72. Id. at 813, 586 S.E.2d at 718.
73. Id., 586 S.E.2d at 717 (citing O'Dell v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 223 Ga.
App. 578, 580, 478 S.E.2d 418, 420 (1996)).
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was that the insured's failure to inform the injured party of the
condemnation petition was not an accident.7 4 The insured's decision to
enter into the contract for the sale of timber "was a deliberate, intentional act to which the damages were a natural and expected consequence." 71 Moreover, by seeking punitive damages, the third-party
complaint explicitly alleged that the act was intentional or at least
evidenced an expectation of harm.7" "Deliberate 77acts with expected
consequences are simply not covered by the policy."
Hall County represents an aggressive approach to coverage by the
court of appeals. Typically, the court will look to the "four corners" of
the complaint to determine whether any coverage exists. Because
negligence was alleged, one would expect the court to conclude that
nonintentional conduct had been alleged. However, the court in Hall
County determined that if the allegations of the complaint make it clear
that the act had to be intentional and no other inference could be drawn,
despite the negligence cause of action, no coverage exists because no
occurrence has been alleged.78 Insurance companies may also attempt
to rely on the court's decision in Hall County for the proposition that
when the "true facts" beyond the four corners of the complaint indicate
that no coverage would be provided, insurance companies do not have a
duty to defend or indemnify the insured.79 In the past the court has
held that if "true facts" beyond the four corners of the complaint trigger
coverage, then the insurance company has a duty to investigate those
facts and, if coverage is triggered, provide a defense and indemnification. o However, the court has never held that an insurance company
can look to the "true facts" to find that no coverage exists. This result
may represent a factual first in Georgia.
D.

Interpretationof "Occurrence"in False Imprisonment Claims

In what is clearly becoming a pattern, the court of appeals has held
that a claim of false imprisonment does not constitute an occurrence,
even if the complaint alleges that such conduct is negligent.8 ' In Pilz
v. Monticello Insurance Co.,2 the insured, a daycare center, was sued

74. Id.
75. Id., 586 S.E.2d at 718.
76. Id. at 814, 586 S.E.2d at 718.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 813, 586 S.E.2d at 718.
79. See id. at 812, 586 S.E.2d at 717.
80. See, e.g., Colonial Oil Indus., Inc. v. Underwriters Subscribing to Policy Nos.
T031504670 and T031504671, 268 Ga. 561, 491 S.E.2d 337 (1997).
81. Pilz v. Monticello Ins. Co., 267 Ga. App. 370, 373, 599 S.E.2d 220, 222-23 (2004).
82. 267 Ga. App. 370, 599 S.E.2d 220 (2004).
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for injuries a child sustained in its care when an employee of the insured
verbally and physically attacked the child. In the complaint plaintiff
alleged claims of assault and battery, negligent performance of a
contractual obligation, negligent false imprisonment, negligence per se,
negligent retention, and intentional infliction of emotional distress."
The court determined that none of the claims were covered under the
applicable CGL policy.'M
Regarding the false imprisonment claim, the court relied upon the
following definition of occurrence located in the policy: "an accident,
including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same
general harmful condition[s]." 85 Because false imprisonment is an
intentional act and not an accident, it did not constitute a covered
occurrence, even though plaintiff alleged that the false imprisonment
was done negligently.8 6
With respect to the assault and battery and other related claims, the
policy contained an exclusion for any bodily injury "arising out of assault
and battery or out of any act or omission in connection with the
prevention or suppression of such act."87 The court held that the
exclusion clearly and unambiguously applied to the assault and battery
claim."M The court then went one step further ahd concluded that
because the negligence claims "arose out of' the alleged assault and
battery, they too were excluded.89 Because the exclusion focused on the
origin or genesis of the claims, none of the negligence claims would have
arisen "but for" the alleged assault and battery; therefore, no coverage
existed under the policy for any of the claims.9s
With the decisions this past year in Owners, Hall County, and Pilz,
the courts have demonstrated that, while determining if coverage exists,
courts will not focus on the theories of recovery alleged. Instead, courts
will look at the complaint as a whole and evaluate whether the conduct
of the insured was intentional in nature. If so, then the court will find
coverage does not exist, even if the complaint alleges nonintentional
theories of recovery, such as negligence.

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at 371, 599 S.E.2d at 221.
Id. at 373, 599 S.E.2d at 223.
Id., 599 S.E.2d at 222.
Id., 599 S.E.2d at 223.
Id. at 371, 599 S.E.2d at 221.
Id. at 372, 599 S.E.2d at 222.
Id., 599 S.E.2d at 223.
Id (discussing Cont1 Cas. Co. v. HSI Fin. Servs., 266 Ga. 260, 466 S.E.2d 4 (1996);

Jefferson Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Dunn, 269 Ga. 213, 496 S.E.2d 696 (1998)).
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E. Interpretationof "Occurrence"When the Alleged Acts are Not
Clearly Intentional
If the allegations in the complaint do not clearly demonstrate that the
insured's conduct was intentional in nature, the court will determine
coverage under a duty to defend by the CGL insurer." In Nationwide
Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Somers,' the insured, an owner of a
cemetery, was sued for breach of a perpetual care contract and
desecration of a grave site with the use of cigarette butts, animal feces,
and other trash. The policy contained the same definition of occurrence
found in Owners, Hall County, and Pilz.9 '
The court held that the insurer had a duty to defend because the
complaint did not demonstrate that the insured intentionally desecrated
the grave.' "[Tihe complaint contains no allegations from which one
could reasonably conclude that the actions that caused the desecration
were not an occurrence."95 "Where the claim is one of potential coverage, doubt as to liability and insurer's duty to defend should be resolved
in favor of the insured."6
Somers is not inconsistent with the courts' decisions in Owners, Hall
County, and Pilz. If the complaint clearly alleges an intentional act,
despite how the claims are identified, then the court will find no
coverage exists. If the complaint creates a question regarding whether
the act was intentional, then the court will give the insured the benefit
of the doubt and find that the insurer's duty to defend has been
triggered.
F No Standing by Injured Party to Bring Direct Action Against the
Insurer
Absent an unsatisfied judgment against the insured or an assignment
of claim from the insured, an injured third party has no standing to file

91. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Somers, 264 Ga. App. 421, 424, 591 S.E.2d 430,
433 (2003) (citing City of Atlanta v. St. Paul Fire & Ins. Co., 231 Ga. App. 706, 707, 498
S.E.2d 782, 784 (1998)).
92. 264 Ga. App. 421, 591 S.E.2d 430 (2003).
93. Id. at 426, 591 S.E.2d at 435.
94. Id. at 425, 591 S.E.2d at 434.
95. Id.
96. Id. (citing Penn-Am. Ins. Co. v. Disabled Am. Veterans, 268 Ga. 564, 565-66, 490
S.E.2d 374, 376 (1997)). The court ruled the policy did not cover plaintiffs claims for
emotional distress or injured feelings because such did not constitute "bodily injury" as
defined by the policy. Unless otherwise specifically provided by the policy, "bodily injury"
does not include nonphysical, emotional, or mental harm. Id. at 427, 591 S.E.2d at 435.
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a direct suit against the insurer.97 In Capitol Indemnity Corp. v.
Fraley,98 the CGL insurer issued a reservation of rights letter to its
insured for claims made by a person allegedly injured by the insured.
The CGL insurer also filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a
declaration that no coverage existed under the policy. In the declaratory
judgment action, the injured party brought a direct action against the
insurer, arguing that the insurer was estopped from asserting the
defense of noncoverage because the insurer did not issue the reservation
of rights letter to the insured in a timely fashion. 9
The court held that in the absence of a judgment against the insured,
the injured party had no rights under the policy and, therefore, could not
sue the insurer directly. ° ° In concluding that the injured party lacks
standing to assert the defense of estoppel against the insurer for failing
to provide a timely notice of reservation of rights, the court relied upon
the general rule that "an injured party has no standing to file a direct
suit against the insurer of a party alleged to have caused the injury
This general
absent an unsatisfied judgment against the insured."'
rule is based upon the fact that the injured party is not in privity of
contract with the insurer under a liability insurance policy.0 2 The
insurer's right to deny coverage flows only to its insured, and the injured
party may not complain about the insurer's failure to provide a timely
Although the insurer named the
reservation of rights notice. 3
insured person in the declaratory judgment action, this did not alter the
court's analysis. Had the insurer not joined the insured party in the
declaratory judgment action as codefendant, no judgment would have
been binding on the injured party and would have subjected the insurer
to the possibility of further litigation from the same coverage issues."'
Fraley has the potential to have a detrimental effect on injured
parties' ability to argue that coverage exists in a declaratory judgment
action. Insurers may use this case to argue that under no circumstances
can an injured party contend that coverage exists in a declaratory
judgment action. Because an injured party is bound by the judgment of
a court in a declaratory judgment action, fairness dictates that an
injured party should be allowed to argue that coverage exists, especially

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Capital Indem. Corp. v. Fraley, 266 Ga. App. 561, 597 S.E.2d 601 (2004).
266 Ga. App. 561, 597 S.E.2d 601 (2004).
Id. at 562-63, 597 S.E.2d at 602.
Id. at 563, 597 S.E.2d at 603.
Id., 597 S.E.2d at 602.
Id., 597 S.E.2d at 603.
Id. at 564, 597 S.E.2d at 603.
Id.
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because the outcome will have a direct impact on the injured's financial
interests. It remains to be seen whether future courts will distinguish
between situations when the injured party brings a direct action against
the insurer arguing that coverage exists and situations when the injured
party forgoes a direct action and merely argues that coverage exists as
a defense in a declaratory judgment action.
G. No Standing by Injured Party to Bring a GarnishmentAction
Against Insurer
In St. Paul Reinsurance Co. v. Ross,1 5 the court held that an injured
party who is a judgment creditor of the insured tortfeasor has no
standing to bring a garnishment action against the insurer if an
undetermined issue of coverage exists.'O° In St. Paul the injured party
obtained a final judgment against the insured tortfeasor with the
insured's consent. The injured party, as a judgment creditor of the
insured, then filed a direct garnishment action against the insurer to
obtain the proceeds of the CGL policy. However, when the injured party
brought his garnishment action, a coverage dispute between the insurer
and its insured had yet to be adjudicated. In fact, the insured had
neither asserted nor assigned any claim against the insurer. 107
In determining that the injured party had no standing to bring a
garnishment action against the insurer, the court held that a garnishment action requires a fixed and certain debt."~ The alleged debt,
such as insurance coverage, was in dispute and, therefore, could not be
"fixed and certain" until the insurer had been adjudicated liable to its
insured. The dissent, however, noted that "[g]arnishment is a clean,
efficient method of deciding coverage, especially when, as here, the issue
is one of law . . .1.9

Similar to Fraley, St. Paul has the potential to have a detrimental
effect on injured parties. An injured party who holds an unsatisfied
judgment against the insured does have standing to bring a direct action
against the insurer. One would think that for the sake of judicial
efficiency and economy, a court would want to decide the issues of
coverage and liability for a debt in a garnishment action. However, in
the future, when the issue of coverage has not yet been adjudicated, a
garnishment action against the insurer will be an improper procedural
vehicle for seeking recovery of the insurance policy proceeds. Instead,

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

266 Ga. App. 75, 596 S.E.2d 193 (2004).
Id. at 78, 596 S.E.2d at 196.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 79-80, 596 S.E.2d at 197.
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an unsatisfied judgment creditor will need to obtain an assignment of
the insured's claim and then bring a direct action for recovery against
the insured based upon the insurer's allegedly improper denial of
coverage.
InsurerEstopped From Challenging Insured's Settlement
Once an insurer denies coverage under the policy, that refusal estops
an insurer from asserting that any settlement that the insured made
with the injured party relieves it of its obligation under a CGL
policy." In Dowse v. Southern Guaranty Insurance Co.,"' the insurer denied coverage for a claim asserted by the injured party against the
insured. The injured party and the insured then entered into a
settlement agreement in which the parties consented to a default
judgment against the insured, and the injured party agreed to seek
recovery for the judgment against the insurer rather than the insured.
In response to the direct action filed against it by the injured party, the
insurer contended that the injured party was not entitled to recover
under the policy because the policy only provided coverage for damages
that the insured was legally obligated to pay, which would not include
the settlement agreement entered into by the injured party and the
insured without the insurer's consent." 2
The court disagreed with the insurer and stated:
H.

[W]hen an insurer denies coverage and absolutely refuses to defend an
action against an insured, when it could do so with reservation of its
rights as to coverage, the legal consequence of such refusal is that it
waives the provisions of the policy against a settlement by the insured
and becomes bound to pay the amount of any settlement made in good
faith plus expenses and attorney[] fees."'
In holding that the insurer was estopped from arguing that the

settlement prevented coverage under the policy, the court relied on the
a right to protect itself against the bad
principle that the insured has
4
faith conduct of its insurer.1

If an insurer has a good faith basis for disclaiming coverage, then the
insurer is not obligated to pay the settlement amount. Rather, the

insurer can only rely upon the policy defenses that supported the

110. Dowse v. S. Guar. Ins. Co., 263 Ga. App. 435, 439, 588 S.E.2d 234, 237 (2003).
111. 263 Ga. App. 435, 588 S.E.2d 234 (2003).
112. Id. at 438, 588 S.E.2d at 237.
113. Id. at 439, 588 S.E.2d at 237. This assumes, of course, that the insurer's denial

of coverage was unjustified.
114. Id.
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disclaimer, and cannot assert, as an additional policy defense, that the
insured entered into the settlement without the insurer's consent. The
safer course of action, which will prevent any estoppel associated with
the insured entering into a settlement with the injured party, is for the
insurer to defend the action under a reservation of rights and file a
declaratory judgment action.
I. Notice to an Independent Agent
Under certain circumstances an insured's notification of a loss to an
independent agent can be deemed proper notice to the insurer. 5 In
Bowen Tree Surgeons, Inc. v. Canal Indemnity Co.," 6 the insured
provided notice to his independent insurance agent of a lawsuit arising
out of an automobile accident but not to his insurer. The independent
agent then failed to notify the insurer of the lawsuit. The insurer denied
coverage under the liability policy because 17the insured failed to provide
the insurer with timely notice of the suit.

Concluding that a question of fact existed regarding whether notice to
an independent agent constituted notice to the insurer under agency
principles, the court held that "[wlhile an independent insurance agent
or broker is normally considered the agent of the insured, it can also[,
depending on the specific facts of each case,] be a dual agent for both the
insurer and the insured.""' The court noted two factors as bearing on
whether an independent agent can serve as the insurer's agent when
accepting notice of a suit." 9 These factors include: (1) whether the
agent customarily accepted premiums and notices of claims on the
insurer's behalf and (2) whether the insurer ever voiced an objection to
this custom. 12 ° "In essence, the duty imposed upon the insurance
agency to forward notice of suits could not exist unless the insurance
agency, through the custom, had also received at least some limited
authority to receive such notice."' 2 '

115. Bowen Tree Surgeons, Inc. v. Canal Indem. Co., 264 Ga. App. 520, 523,591 S.E.2d
415, 417 (2003).
116. 264 Ga. App. 520, 591 S.E.2d 415 (2003).
117. Id. at 522, 591 S.E.2d at 416-17.
118. Id., 591 S.E.2d at 416 (citing Byrne v. Reardon, 196 Ga. App. 735, 736, 397 S.E.2d
22, 24 (1990)).
119. Id. at 523, 591 S.E.2d at 417.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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IV. TITLE INSURANCE-ARBITRATION
The Federal Arbitration Act 22 does not preempt the Georgia Arbitration Code,' 23 inasmuch as the Georgia Arbitration Code excludes from
its coverage arbitration provisions in insurance contracts. In McKnight
v. Chicago Title Insurance Co.,124 the title insurance policy contained
a clause providing the parties with a right to arbitration in the event of
a dispute between the title company and the insured. Following the
denial of the claim, the insured filed suit against the title company. The
title company then moved to compel arbitration.'
The Georgia Arbitration Code excludes arbitration of disputes arising
out of an insurance contract between an insurer and insured. 126 The
title company argued that the Federal Arbitration Act preempted the
Georgia Arbitration Code, and therefore, the insurer had a right to
demand arbitration. Interpreting the statutory language, the court
disagreed and upheld the denial of the title company's motion to compel
arbitration.'2 7 Consequently, it remains the law in Georgia that a
mandatory arbitration clause in an insurance policy is invalid and
unenforceable.
V.

A.

AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE

Liability Insurance

1. Declaratory Judgment-Semantics and Timing. In last
year's survey,"2 we discussed the court of appeals decision in Direct
General Insurance Co. v. Drawdy,'" wherein the court held that an
insurer, which had denied coverage for a collision and filed an action
seeking a declaratory judgment on its coverage defense, but which
nevertheless undertook the defense of a lawsuit seeking damages for
injuries allegedly caused in the collision subject to a reservation of

122. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (2000 & Supp. 2001).
123. O.C.G.A. §§ 9-9-1 to -84 (1982 & Supp. 2004).
124. 358 F.3d 854 (S.D. Ga. 2004).
125. Id. at 856.
126. O.C.G.A. § 9-9-2(c) (1993 & Supp. 2004).
127. McKnight, 358 F.3d at 859.
128. Stephen L. Cotter, Stephen M. Schatz & Bradley S. Wolff, Insurance, 55 MERCER
L. REv. 277, 289 (2003).
129. 258 Ga. App. 149, 572 S.E.2d 629 (2002), rev'd, 277 Ga. 107, 586 S.E.2d 228
(2003), vacated by 264 Ga. App. 250 (2003).
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rights, could properly pursue its declaratory judgment action.13 ° In
Drawdy v. Direct General Insurance Co.,"' the Georgia Supreme Court
reversed that decision. 132
The supreme court granted certiorari in the case to consider:
[Wihether an automobile insurer, after expressly denying coverage
without qualification or conditions, may bring an action for declaratory
judgment to determine its contractual duties to its insured when no
litigation is pending against the insured at the time the declaratory
judgment action is filed but the insurer thereafter provides a defense
to the insured under a reservation of rights.'33
The court's holding that declaratory judgment is not available when an
insurance company has denied a claim was based on the fact that having
denied the claim, the insurer is neither uncertain nor insecure in regard
to its rights, status, or legal relations."3 The supreme court distinguished this case from Colonial Insurance Co. v. Progressive Casualty, 135 upon which the court of appeals relied, on the ground that in
Colonial the insurer had sent only a "qualified denial letter" to the
insured, and the insurer did not file its declaratory judgment action until
after the tort suit arising from the underlying collision, had been
filed. 136 The court determined the declaratory judgment action, which
was filed before the tort action, was invalid.'3 7 The court reasoned
that Direct General had "required its insured to act to his detriment by
putting him through the expense and trouble of defending the declaratory judgment action and responding to discovery."" 3 Moreover, the
court reasoned that an insured would presumably have to engage in an
1 39
equal amount of discovery no matter which action was filed first.
Thus, Direct General's declaratory judgment action appears to have
failed because it acted pro-actively in filing its action before the filing of
the tort suit and because its denial letter was not "qualified," despite the
fact that the insurer defended the tort suit once it was filed.

130.
131.

Id. at 151, 572 S.E.2d at 632.
277 Ga. 107, 586 S.E.2d 228 (2003).

132. Id. at 110, 586 S.E.2d at 231.
133.

Id. at 108, 586 S.E.2d at 229.

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 109, 586 S.E.2d at 230.
252 Ga. App. 391, 556 S.E.2d 486 (2001).
Drawdy, 277 Ga. at 109, 586 S.E.2d at 230.
Id. at 108, 586 S.E.2d at 229-30.
Id. at 110, 586 S.E.2d at 231.
Id.
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2. Motor Carriers-Policy Cancellation. In answering certified
questions from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the Georgia
40
Supreme Court, in Progressive Preferred Insurance Co. v. Ramirez,'
held that an insurer that cancels a motor carrier's liability insurance
policy for nonpayment of premiums, but fails to notify the Public Service
Commission ("PSC") of that cancellation, continues to be liable for
by the carrier until thirty days after notice is provided
injuries caused
14 1
to the PSC.
In April 1999 Progressive issued the insured a policy that covered
trucks used in his business. In compliance with Rule 1-8-1_.01142 of
the PSC, Progressive sent a certificate of insurance, "Form E," to the
PSC in July 1999. Progressive canceled the policy in July 1999.
Progressive gave notice to the insured but did not give notice to the PSC
until September 1999. Between the time of the cancellation notice to the
insured and the notice to the PSC, one of the trucks covered by the
policy was involved in a collision that resulted in the death of Ramirez's
mother. Ramirez obtained a $1 million wrongful death judgment against
the insured and filed suit against Progressive seeking the $500,000
limits of the policy. Progressive removed the case to the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, which granted
summary judgment to Ramirez. Progressive appealed to the Eleventh
Circuit, 3which then certified two questions to the Georgia Supreme
14
Court.
The first question was whether an insurer's failure to notify the PSC
of cancellation results in the policy continuing to its limits or whether
the continuation coverage is limited to the statutory minimums. The
issue arose because, in this case, the insurer did not file the policy itself
with the agency but filed only the form provided by the PSC, which
states that the insurance policy provides coverage at or above the
Progressive argued that the certificate of
statutory minimums.
insurance was a distinct legal entity and that when the policy itself was
canceled by notice to the insured, the filing of Form E provided the
coverage limits.'" The Georgia Supreme Court disagreed, noting that
because the certificate of insurance provides a place to enter the actual

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

277 Ga. 392, 588 S.E.2d 751 (2003).
Id. at 394, 588 S.E.2d at 754.
Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Rule 1-8-1-.01.
Ramirez, 277 Ga. at 392, 588 S.E.2d at 752.
Id. at 393-94, 588 S.E.2d at 753.
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policy number, the policy itself remains completely in14full force and
effect until it is properly canceled by notice to the PSC. 1
The second question certified from the Eleventh Circuit concerned a
limitation of liability provision within the policy. This limitation of
liability, according to its language, applied when the insurer was
required by law to provide coverage not otherwise provided by the policy,
and the provision limited any such coverage to the statutory minimum
amount.' 41 Consistent with its answer to the first question, the
supreme court held that because the policy itself remained in effect until
to the PSC, the coverage limitation in the
proper notice was provided
147
policy was not an issue.
3. Bad Faith-Assignment of Claim. In its third appeal, the court
in Empire Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Driskell'4 held that injured
plaintiff parties, who took an assignment of the insured defendant's
rights against an insurer, could not recover more than the policy limits
of the coverage at issue on a claim for a bad faith failure to settle if the
injured parties had never offered to settle for an amount within the
limits of coverage. 49 The case involved a dispute between injured
parties, as assignees of the insured, and an insurer that refused to
defend the insured. The insured, Metro Courier Inc., had a $1 million
liability insurance policy with Empire. When the Harrises were injured
in an accident with a Metro vehicle driven by a Metro employee, the
Metro vehicle was not specifically listed as a covered auto in the policy.
The insurer, therefore, refused to defend the suit, claiming that the
vehicle was not covered. The injured parties and Metro arbitrated their
claim, which resulted in a $3.15 million award in favor of the injured
parties. Metro consented to the entry of judgment in this amount and
assigned its rights against Empire to the injured parties. The Harrises
brought a suit against Empire to collect part or all of the judgment."0
In previous proceedings the trial court and the court of appeals held
Empire owed a duty to defend the case because rules promulgated by the
Georgia Public Service Commission"'. require that a motor carrier's
policy must provide minimum coverage, regardless of whether a vehicle
is specifically described in the policy. The mandatory coverage limits

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id. at 395, 588 S.E.2d at 754.
Id. at 395-96, 588 S.E.2d at 754-55.
Id. at 396, 588 S.E.2d at 754-55.
264 Ga. App. 646, 592 S.E.2d 80 (2003).
Id. at 647, 592 S.E.2d at 81.

150. Id.
151. Ga. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Rule 1-8-1-.01.
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were $100,000 per person and $300,000 per incident. Therefore, in the
prior proceedings, the court of appeals held that the policy provided
After that decision
coverage up to $200,000 for the accident in question.
152
Empire paid the Harrises $200,000 plus interest.
The Harrises, as assignees of Metro, sued Empire alleging breach of
its duty to defend and a bad faith failure to settle within the policy
limits. At trial the case went to a jury and the jury found for the
Harrises on both claims, awarding $9000 for failure to defend and $6.48
million for failure to settle. The trial court directed a verdict for Empire
on the Harrises' punitive damage claim. Both sides appealed.15
The court of appeals agreed with Empire that the trial court erred in
allowing the Harrises to recover more than $200,000 in damages on the
failure to settle the claim. 154 Initially, the Harrises had offered to
settle the case for $1 million, which was the liability limit on the face of
the policy, but they never offered to settle the case within the applicable
$200,000 coverage limit. Reversing the trial court's entry of judgment
for $6.48 million, the court noted that because Empire had already paid
the Harrises $200,000 plus interest, the Harrises could not recover
additional damages for the failure to settle the claim. 5 '
The court also affirmed the trial court's directed verdict against the
Harrises on their punitive damages claim. 5 6 Relying on established
law prohibiting the assignment of claims for punitive damages, the court
held that because the Harrises sued Empire only as assignees of Metro,
the Harrises could not recover punitive damages on the bad faith claims
pursued in this case. 5 '
Similarly, in Canal Indemnity Co. v. Greene,'58 the court of appeals
held that a claim against an insurer for a bad faith failure to settle
under the statutory penalty provision of section 33-4-6 of the Official
Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.")' 59 is not assignable under
Georgia law.'60 However, the court of appeals held that section 33-4-6
is not the exclusive remedy for an insurer's bad faith failure to

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Driskell, 264 Ga. App. at 646, 592 S.E.2d at 81.
Id. at 647, 592 S.E.2d at 81.
Id. at 648, 592 S.E.2d at 82.
Id. at 649, 592 S.E.2d at 82.
Id., 592 S.E.2d at 83.
Id.
265 Ga. App. 67, 593 S.E.2d 41 (2003).
O.C.G.A. § 33-4-6 (Supp. 2004).
Canal, 265 Ga. App. at 72-73, 593 S.E.2d at 46.
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settle.16 ' A common-law tort claim for compensatory damages
162
of property due to the failure to settle is an assignable claim.
4. Bad Faith-Failure to Pay Claim. In Allstate Insurance Co. v.
Smith," the insured made a claim on her auto policy for damages
caused to her vehicle by theft. Allstate denied the claim, and the
insured sued. The insured claimed that Allstate breached the terms of
the policy and also sought statutory penalties under O.C.G.A. section 334-6 for bad faith refusal to pay. In the trial court, the jury awarded
plaintiff $16,000, an amount representing the entire market value of the
car, plus penalties and attorney fees. However, the evidence at trial
showed the vehicle was repairable and that the cost of repair was
The court of appeals affirmed the judgment
approximately $7000.1'
based on the jury's verdict, concluding that the insurer breached its duty
However, the court reversed the
under the insurance policy.'65
damages award on the ground that the fair market value of the vehicle
was an improper basis for compensating plaintiff when the vehicle was
repairable."6 The court also reversed the award of statutory penalties
for bad faith because the court determined there were sufficient facts to
suggest a reasonable basis for Allstate's belief that the insured may have
been involved in a fraudulent claim, and "[plenalties for bad faith are
not authorized where the insurance company has any reasonable ground
67
to contest the claim and where there is a disputed question of fact."'
5. Duty to Defend-Notice of Suit. Another issue in Canal
concerned the insurer's duty to defend a suit when its insured failed to
notify the insurer of the suit and allegedly failed to cooperate with the
insurer by being unavailable. The case dealt with an automobile
accident between Greene and the insured, Stephens. Stephens did not
own the truck he was driving but had possession of the truck through an
extended test drive from a car dealership. Greene filed suit against
Stephens in July 2001. Greene forwarded a copy of the complaint, which
included a handwritten notation of the civil action number assigned to
the case and the clerk of court's note that the case had been filed on July
12, to the insurer's agent via certified mail and fax. No summons or
return of service was sent to the insurer. The insurer then hired an
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164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at 73, 593 S.E.2d at 46.
Id.
266 Ga. App. 411, 597 S.E.2d 500 (2004).
Id. at 412, 597 S.E.2d at 502.
Id. at 411, 597 S.E.2d at 501.
Id.
Id. at 413, 597 S.E.2d at 502.
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attorney to represent Stephens. The complaint was served on Stephens
in September 2001. Stephens never notified the insurer of the service
of the suit. Neither Stephens nor the attorney ever responded to any
pleadings in the case, and a default judgment in the amount of $500,000
was entered against Stephens."8
Stephens assigned his claims against the insurer, Canal, to Greene,
and Greene filed an action against Canal the following year. Canal
moved for summary judgment, arguing that it did not receive proper
notice of Greene's suit against Stephens because Greene did not provide
a copy of the summons or any return of service to Canal. 169 The court
of appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of this motion, determining
that Greene substantially complied with the statutory requirement. 7 °
The court concluded all the information in the summons could have been
gleaned from the information on the complaint, and Canal failed to show
it was deprived of an opportunity to make a timely and adequate
investigation. 7 ' Finally, the court of appeals affirmed the denial of
Canal's motion for summary judgment on the failure to cooperate issue,
noting that material issues existed regarding whether Stephens had
been uncooperative.' 7 2 In particular the court noted that Greene's
attorney did not have any apparent difficulty in contacting Stephens or
in gaining his cooperation, Canal never asked Greene's attorney where
to locate Stephens, and Canal did not follow the recommendations of its
own adjuster with regard to locating Stephens.'73
6. Policy Rescission for Material Alisrepresentation. According
to the court of appeals decision in Liberty Insurance Corp. v. Ferguson, "' 4 the public policy requiring mandatory liability insurance
trumps an insurer's right to rescind a policy for fraud or misrepresentation by the insured. 5 Liberty filed a declaratory judgment
action seeking a determination that it did not have to provide coverage
for a collision because the insured concealed material facts on the policy
application. The primary insured failed to list her son, who was living
with her and had free use of one of her vehicles, on her insurance
application. Her son had a variety of serious traffic violations, including
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Canal, 265 Ga. App. at 68, 593 S.E.2d at 43.
Id. at 69, 593 S.E.2d at 43.
Id.
Id. at 71, 593 S.E.2d at 45.
Id.
Id. at 72, 593 S.E.2d at 45.
263 Ga. App. 714, 589 S.E.2d 290 (2003).
Id. at 715-16, 589 S.E.2d at 291.
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two DUIs, on his record. 176 The application contained the following
language, "I further agree that this policy shall be null and void if these
answers are false or given with the intent to deceive or materially affect
the acceptance of the risk assumed by Liberty Mutual." 177 In its
which
arguments, Liberty relied on O.C.G.A. section 33-24-7,'
provides that:
[M]isrepresentations, omissions, concealment of facts, and incorrect
statements shall not prevent a recovery under the policy... unless (1)
[flraudulent; (2) [mlaterial either to the acceptance of the risk or to the
hazard assumed by the insurer; or (3) [tlhe insurer in good faith would
...not have issued the policy.., if the true facts had been known to
the insurer as required either by the application for the policy ... or
otherwise."'
Although Liberty provided the affidavit of an underwriter stating that
if the son had been listed on the policy application, Liberty would not
have issued the policy, the court held that Liberty could not rely on this
code section to avoid its obligation under the policy, and the policy could
not be voided retrospectively because the Georgia Supreme Court had
previously held that this statute did not apply to compulsory insurance,
such as automobile liability insurance."8 The court also held that the
existence of other insurance available to pay the damages, such as an
uninsured motorist coverage plan, was immaterial to whether the
liability policy could be voided for misrepresentation.' 8 '
7. Loaner Cars-Excess Insurance. When an auto dealer's
customer is driving a loaner car, O.C.G.A. section 33-34-3(d) 82 provides that the customer's own liability insurance provides primary
In
coverage and the dealer's policy provides excess insurance.'8
Hendrix v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co., s the court of
appeals resolved a dispute concerning the amount of a dealer's excess
insurance coverage for a loaner car.'85 The dealer's policy in this case
provided liability insurance of $300,000 with an additional umbrella
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Id. at 714, 589 S.E.2d at 290.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 33-24-7 (1996).
Id.
Liberty Ins., 263 Ga. App. at 715-16, 589 S.E.2d 291-92.
Id. at 716, 589 S.E.2d at 292.
O.C.G.A. § 33-34-3(d) (Supp. 2004).
Id.
263 Ga. App. 589, 588 S.E.2d 761 (2003).
Id. at 592-93, 588 S.E.2d at 763.
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coverage of $6 million for certain insureds. However, for customers of
the dealership, the policy provided only the minimum statutory limits
and stated that when other insurance provided coverage, the most the
insurer would pay was $5000. When a customer was involved in a
collision while driving a loaner car owned by the dealership, the driver
of the other car sued the customer and filed a declaratory judgment
action against the insurer to determine the amount of liability coverage
available. Plaintiff argued that the policy's limitation to mandatory
minimum limits or $5000 was a violation of subsection (d) because it
eliminated the excess coverage and that $6.3 million in liability should
be available. Conversely, the insurer argued that it was entitled to limit
its coverage to $5000 because the customer had his own liability
insurance that at least covered the minimum required amount.' The
court of appeals held that both parties were wrong." 7 Although the
court held the customer was not within the definition of an "insured" for
the purpose of benefitting from the larger policy limits afforded to
certain insureds, 8 ' the court also held that the policy language
limiting the excess coverage to $5000 was void under O.C.G.A. section
33-34-3(d) and that the insurer was liable up to the statutory minimums
as of the date of the accident." 9
8. Insured's Duty to Read Policy. In Canalesv. Wilson Southland
Insurance Agency, 9 ' the court of appeals reaffirmed that an insured
has a duty to read his insurance policy and cannot generally rely on an
agent's alleged representations to provide coverage in derogation of the
policy language.' 9 ' The insured filed a claim with his insurer based
on an accident that occurred in Mexico, despite the fact that the policy
explicitly stated that it applied only to losses occurring in the United
States or Canada. The insured then sued the insurance agency alleging
fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. Although there was a dispute
regarding what representations were made by the insurance agent, there
was no dispute that the policy explicitly provided no coverage for losses
occurring in Mexico." Because the insured was unable to prove that
he relied on the agent's expertise in selecting an appropriate policy for
him, that there was any confidential relationship between the agent and
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Id. at 590-91, 588 S.E.2d at 762.
Id. at 591-92, 588 S.E.2d at 762-63.
Id. at 591, 588 S.E.2d at 762.
Id. at 591-92, 588 S.E.2d at 762-63.
261 Ga. App. 529, 583 S.E.2d 203 (2003).
Id. at 531, 583 S.E.2d at 205.
Id. at 532, 583 S.E.2d at 205.
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the insured, or that the agent's alleged misrepresentations of coverage
prevented the insured from reading the policy, the court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the insurance
agency.19 3
B.

UninsuredMotorist Coverage

1. Increased Risk for Insureds Traveling in Florida. Florida is
a no-fault state, and to pursue a suit for damages on account of personal
injury resulting from a motor vehicle accident, the injured person must
Because Georgia applies the
show permanent injury or death."9
doctrine of lex loci delicto, the law of the place where the tort occurred
controls. When a Georgia resident is injured in a motor vehicle accident,
but not seriously enough to qualify for the exemption to Florida's nofault statute, the injured person can recover uninsured motorist ("UM")
benefits from the policy issued in Georgia.'95 In Georgia Farm Bureau
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Williams,"9 the court of appeals dealt with
these circumstances as a matter of first impression.' 97 The insured
was involved in a car accident in Florida and was unable to claim
damages from the other driver due to Florida's no-fault statute. When
the insured made a claim for benefits under her own UM coverage, her
insurer denied the claim. The insured sued her insurer and sought to
recover both her damages and a penalty under O.C.G.A. section 33-4-6
for the insurer's bad faith failure to provide coverage. The insurer
contended that no benefits were due because the tortfeasor was insured,
198
and the policyholder could not establish the tortfeasor's liability.
The court of appeals held that when the insured is involved in an
accident in a jurisdiction that does not allow recovery of damages from
the tortfeasor, the insured's UM coverage is triggered, just as it would
be if the tortfeasor were discharged in bankruptcy or protected by
sovereign immunity.' 99 However, because this was a case of first
impression, the court concluded that the insurer could not be held liable
for bad faith and reversed the trial court's denial of summary judgment
on that issue. 2"

Id. at 533-34, 583 S.E.2d 206-07.
194. FLk STAT. ch. § 627.737(2) (1995).
195. Georgia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 266 Ga. App. 540,541,597 S.E.2d
430, 431 (2004).
196. 266 Ga. App. 540, 597 S.E.2d 430 (2004).
197. Id. at 541, 597 S.E.2d at 431.
198. Id. at 540, 597 S.E.2d at 431.
199. Id. at 541-42, 597 S.E.2d at 431-32.
200. Id. at 542, 597 S.E.2d at 432.
193.
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2. Statutory Construction Results in No Coverage.
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section 33-7-11(a)(1), 20 1 Georgia's UM statute, provides that no policy
of automobile liability insurance shall be issued in the state "unless it
contains an endorsement or provisions undertaking to pay the insured
all sums which said insured shall be legally entitled to recover as
damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle
....2o2 In Atlanta Casualty Co. v. Gordon, °3 five of the court of
appeals judges construed this statutory provision contrary to what
"appears clear on its face" 0 4 and held that a UM carrier is not obligated to pay benefits to an insured on account of the wrongful death of the
insured's son because the son lived with his mother and was, thus, not
himself an insured under the policy.0 5
In this case the insured's son, a minor, was struck and killed by an
uninsured motorist. The parents were separated, and the son lived with
his mother at the time of the incident. The parents sued the driver for
wrongful death and sought to recover under the father's UM policy. The
insurer was denied summary judgment by the trial court and pursued
an interlocutory appeal. 2 6 The court of appeals reversed, holding that
the legislature did not intend to require insurers to pay damages for the
deaths of people not insured by the policy.20 7
This case is particularly interesting for the lengthy and vigorous
dissent written by Judge Barnes and joined by Judge Eldridge. 28' The
dissenters argued that the majority opinion represents an "activist
interpretation of an unambiguous statute."2" The dissent further
chides the majority, "our job as members of the judiciary does not start
by deciding what we think the legislature means."210 Judge Barnes
takes the majority to task for their construction of the statute, writing:
As the majority notes, the language in this case is clear on its face.
The majority then, through some sort of judicial clairvoyance, engrafts
what it believes the legislature must have intended. This approach, of
course, assumes that the legislature was incapable of understanding
the meaning of "all," and that the General Assembly did not want
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O.C.G.A. § 33-7-11(a)(1) (Supp. 2004).
Id.
266 Ga. App. 666, 598 S.E.2d 70 (2004).
Id. at 667, 598 S.E.2d at 71.
Id.
Id. at 666, 598 S.E.2d at 71.
Id.
Id. at 669, 598 S.E.2d at 73 (Barnes, J., dissenting).
Id. (Barnes, J., dissenting).
Id. (Barnes, J., dissenting).
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insureds to be able to recover for all damages caused by uninsured
motorists, but only for certain damages that the majority proceeds to
define.211
Applying the normal rules of statutory construction, the dissent argued
that the statute at issue was not susceptible to an interpretation
contrary to its plain meaning and that if the legislature meant
something different from a requirement that UM carriers must "pay the
insured all sums which said insured shall be legally entitled to recover
as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured vehicle," the
legislature can and should rewrite the statute.2 12 Instead, Judge
Barnes wrote that the majority has amended the statute to add language
which she bracketed, as follows: "UM carriers must 'pay the insured all
sums which said insured shall be legally entitled to recover as damages
from the owner or operator of an insured vehicle [for bodily injury or
property damage to an insured or covered person] .... ,213
Finally,
the dissent argued that even if there was some ambiguity in the statute,
the court would be required to construe it broadly to provide coverage for
the innocent insured, the father, who is legally entitled to recover
wrongful death damages from an "irresponsible insured driver."2 14
3. Circumstantial Evidence Insufficient. In Dawkins v. Doe,215
a father filed a wrongful death action against an unidentified driver
after his son's body was found by the side of an interstate highway with
a headlight cover, turn signal cover, and parts of a rear view mirror near
the body. The mother's UM insurer answered the complaint and filed
a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted.2 16 The
court of appeals affirmed the summary judgment based on a lack of
evidence that the unidentified driver was negligent or that his actions
caused the decedent's death.2 17 The court based its ruling on affidavits
and testimony of state troopers and crime scene investigators who could
not determine whether the decedent had been struck in the travel lanes
of the roadway or in the emergency lane or whether the vehicle parts
had actually made contact with the decedent.21 Because the circum-

211. Id. at 670, 598 S.E.2d at 74 (Barnes, J. dissenting) (emphasis in original, internal
footnote omitted).
212. Id. at 669, 598 S.E.2d at 73 (Barnes, J., dissenting).
213. Id. at 671, 598 S.E.2d at 74 (Barnes, J., dissenting).
214. Id. at 672, 598 S.E.2d at 75 (Barnes, J., dissenting).
215. 263 Ga. App. 737, 589 S.E.2d 303 (2003).

216. Id. at 737-38, 589 S.E.2d at 304-05.
217. Id. at 738, 589 S.E.2d at 305.
218. Id. at 739, 589 S.E.2d at 305-06.
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stantial evidence on causation gave rise to no more than conjecture, the
court held that summary judgment for the insurer was proper. 1 9
4. Procedural Faults, Not Immunity, Lead to No Recovery. In
Ward v. Allstate Insurance Co.,220 the insured's failure to preserve the
ability to recover from the tortfeasor through a series of procedural
missteps prevented his recovery from either the tortfeasor or his UM
carrier. Plaintiff collided with a sheriff's deputy during a police chase.
He attempted to sue the deputy in his personal capacity, but the suit
was barred by the deputy's official immunity. When he attempted to sue
the deputy in his official capacity, the statute of limitations had already
run, and the court granted summary judgment. Plaintiff then sought to
recover from his UM carrier.22 ' The trial court granted summary
judgment for the insurer, and the court of appeals affirmed, because
plaintiff could not show that he was "legally entitled to recover" damages
from the deputy.22 2 Although plaintiff could have made a valid claim
for UM benefits if the tort claim had been totally barred by official
immunity, here the official capacity claim against the deputy failed only
because the statute of limitations had run. Thus, plaintiff's procedural
errors, and not the deputy's immunity, prevented recovery of damages
from the alleged tortfeasor. Under O.C.G.A. section 33-7-11,223 the UM
carrier had no obligation to pay benefits where the insured could not
establish a legal entitlement to recovery from the tortfeasor.2' The
motorist could not recover against his insurer and the exception to the
rule did not cover this situation because plaintiff could have recovered
against the deputy were it not for his own error.225
5. Multiple Tortfeasors, Liability Insurance Setoff. In Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Boylan,226 the court of appeals applied
the rationale of Jones v. Cotton States Mutual Insurance Co.2 2 7 and
held that insureds are entitled to collect UM benefits, without a setoff
for one tortfeasor's liability insurance, when an uninsured joint
tortfeasor contributes to the accident.2"s This case involved an acci-
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Id. at 603, 595 S.E.2d at 97-98.
Id., 595 S.E.2d at 98.
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Id. at 605, 595 S.E.2d at 99.
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dent with three vehicles. An unidentified driver and his vehicle
interacted with the vehicle driven by the other tortfeasor, causing that
tortfeasor to lose control and strike the vehicle of the insureds.
Therefore, John Doe and the named tortfeasor were joint tortfeasors in
the collision. The UM insurer sought to offset its UM coverage with the
payments made by the named tortfeasor's liability insurance. 229 The
court of appeals affirmed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of
the insureds, holding the UM insurer was liable for up to the full limits
of its policy, $25,000 per insured for bodily injury, despite the fact that
each insured had received $100,000 from the named tortfeasor's liability
insurer.3 ° The court said this result put the insureds in the same
position as they would have been in if the John Doe driver had been
known and insured, since the insureds would have been able to recover
from that driver in addition to the recovery they received from the
known tortfeasor.23 '
6. Primacy of Policies. A controversial issue in UM cases can be
determining which among two or more policies of UM coverage, provides
primary coverage and, therefore, must pay benefits first. The Georgia
courts have developed two tests which, when properly applied, resolve
the question of priority in most cases: the "receipt of premium" test and
the "more closely identified with" test.

s2

These tests do not easily

resolve the issue in every case, and the Georgia Supreme Court has held
that stackable policies of UM coverage can not be prorated, thus leaving
the courts to sometimes struggle with distinguishing between apparently
indistinguishable relationships between policyholders and policies. 3
Such was the case in Clarendon National Insurance Co. v. Sledge.234
The insured had a personal insurance policy, which included UM
coverage, and his sole proprietorship business also had an insurance
policy with UM coverage. The insured was involved in an accident while
driving a vehicle insured under his personal policy, but while he was
towing a car for his business. Because the business was an unincorporated sole proprietorship, the insured paid the premiums for both
policies, and his relationship to each policy was equally close. The trial
court thus determined the policies afforded equal priority of UM

229. Id. at 723, 589 S.E.2d at 280.
230. Id. at 724, 589 S.E.2d at 281.
231. Id. at 726, 589 S.E.2d at 282.
232. Canal Ins. Co. v. Merch., 225 Ga. App. 61, 62, 483 S.E.2d 311, 312 (1997).
233. Ga. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 255 Ga. 166,
167, 336 S.E.2d 237, 238 (1985).
234. 261 Ga. App. 661, 583 S.E.2d 514 (2003).
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coverage and should be prorated. The commercial insurer appealed.235
The court of appeals, recognizing that proration among stackable policies
is not permitted, held that when the insured pays the premiums for both
policies and is equally "identified" with both policies, the circumstances
of the injury must be considered to determine the priority of coverage.23 6 In the circumstances of this case, the court determined that at
the time of the accident, because the insured was towing a car in
he was likely "more closely
furtherance of his pecuniary interests,
23 7
identified with" the commercial policy.
VI.

DISABILITY INSURANCE

Always erudite District Court Judge Avant Edenfield thoroughly
evaluated important public policy issues presented by a disabled
attorney. The legal question was whether his professional transgressions legally disabled him from receiving compensable factual disability."s
In Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Woodall,239
Massachusetts Mutual insured Woodall, an attorney, for disability for
many years. Starting in 1995, Woodall, in pursuit of a personal goal of
a $1 million fee, wrongfully inflated his attorney fees and after being
ordered to account, refused to do so. Ultimately, he was disbarred. The
obvious associated depression was stipulated to be "principallyand
directly from his being subject to allegations of misconduct in the
[Shiggs] case" and his anticipation of bar actions later taken.240
Massachusetts Mutual had initiated disability benefit payments before
Upon disbarment Massachusetts Mutual issued a
disbarment.
reservation of rights letter. This litigation determined whether this
disbarred attorney, now a resident of Texas, in an effort to avoid
Georgia's contempt of court powers, could profit from his wrongdoing
and, if so, to what extent.24 ' The court engaged in a thorough discussion of the public policy considerations that Massachusetts Mutual
claimed should be read into its policy.242

The court then reviewed

persuasive authority, drawing distinctions between legal disability, those
not allowed to engage in activity, and factual disability, those who are
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Id. at 661, 583 S.E.2d at 515.
Id. at 663, 583 S.E.2d at 516.
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Many of these
unable to do so because of a factual condition.2"
authorities were in opposite to Woodall's case, wherein the wrongful
conduct occurred before the factual disability was established yet before
the legal disability disbarment was adjudicated. 2 " Ultimately, the
court made an "Erie guess" that Georgia courts would determine that
when a legal disability consequence results from wrongful conduct, a
"factfinder may disregard, on public policy grounds, the mere fact that
the 'factual' disability preceded the legal disability."245 Massachusetts
Mutual's failure to issue a reservation of rights letter regarding these
issues until months after Woodall's disbarment led to more complications, which the court had to review and which drew attention to the
scarcity of Georgia law on the subject of effectiveness and scope of
reservation of rights.2" The court accepted Woodall's argument that
Georgia law requires insurers to timely notify their insureds of the
specific basis of their reservation of rights, and Massachusetts Mutual
did not initially do so. 247 Hence, the carrier was held to have made
voluntary payments until that point in time when it did adequately
reserve its rights. 2" From that point forward, Massachusetts Mutual
was entitled to withhold payment.2 49 This opinion is recommended to
practitioners to use when benefits should be paid and there are both
legal and factual disabilities.
In City of Barnesville v. Littlejohn,2 5 ° one insured successfully ran
the gauntlet to obtain disability payments. Littlejohn's long history of
back difficulties led the city to terminate his employment. Within a
month of termination, Littlejohn was back in the city offices applying for
disability. He had previously applied for Social Security disability,
which he did not receive until several years later.25 ' The city unsuccessfully defended this claim through the definition of disability, to wit:
"A physical or mental disability of a participant who because of such
disability becomes entitled to receive disability insurance benefits under
the Federal Social Security Act, as amended."252 The court quickly
rejected the city's claim that the social security disability benefits must
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have been adjudicated before Littlejohn's employment was terminated.253 "Statutory construction must square with common sense and
reasoning. "2 " The court rejected the associated argument, i.e., that
the social security award must actually occur within one year of
termination, for similar reasons.25
VI.

LIFE INSURANCE

In Slakman v. Continental Casualty Co.,256 the Georgia Supreme
Court, in response to a certified question from the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, held that O.C.G.A. section 33-25-13257 does not bar an individual from receiving benefits under a
murder victim's life insurance policy before the accused's right to a direct
appeal has been exhausted.2 58 The supreme court took the middle
ground. Some foreign statutes establish a prima facie defense upon
mere conviction.25 9 Slakman argued for no such presumption until all
potential collateral challenges to the criminal conviction were concluded.
Upon exhaustion of direct appeals, the court held that a presumption
should and does arise under O.C.G.A. section 33-25-13.2 °
Livoti v. Aycock 261 reminds us to carefully read and consider the
forms insurers use, as "renewal" did not equal "replacement."282 This
viatical settlement exchanged $144,000 for the insured's policy "and all
renewals thereof," apparently anticipating an early demise and a
continuation of the policy. Unknown to the parties, Aycock's employer,
the Emory University School of Medicine, changed its group-life
insurance program to a totally different "replacement" policy, which did
not name the original purchasers.2 3 In a detailed analysis of contract
construction, the court held that "renewal" meant extension of the first

253.
254.
255.
256.

Id., 590 S.E.2d at 379.
Id.
Id. at 189, 590 S.E.2d at 380.
277 Ga. 189, 587 S.E.2d 24 (2003).

257.

O.C.G.A. § 33-25-13 (1996 & Supp. 2004). This statute provides for prima facie

evidence of guilt without such a conviction. Upon a determination under an appropriate
standard of proof, a murderer may be barred from receiving benefits under a life insurance
policy.
258. Slakman, 277 Ga. at 190, 587 S.E.2d at 26.
259. Id. at 190-91, 587 S.E.2d at 26.
260. Id. at 191, 587 S.E.2d at 26-27.
261. 263 Ga. App. 897, 590 S.E.2d 159 (2003).
262. Id. at 899, 590 S.E.2d at 162.
263. Id. at 898, 590 S.E.2d at 162.
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contract between the same parties, whereas "replacement" involved
different terms between different parties.264
Through a string of opinions 265 dealing with diverse subject matters,
the courts enforced, as written, the terms of various life insurance
policies. In Bogard v. Inter-State Assurance Co.,266 the class unsuccessfully attempted to recoup premiums for the period of no coverage, i.e.,
from time of payment until the policy was physically delivered and,
therefore, first effective. In Bogard's individual situation, this amounted
to fifty-four days of premiums for which no coverage was afforded.26 7
The court concluded by stating, "[i]f, as a result of delay in the delivery
[the] insured finds himself offered a less advantageous contract than he
expected, he is free to refuse it."2"
This theme of contract enforcement continued in TransAmerica
Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. Miles,6 9 wherein Judge Hunt declined
to read out of the policy a provision that the policy shall not take effect
until after "the owner has personally received the policy ... and while
the proposed insured is in good health."20 The relevant timeline
included TransAmerica's August 31, 1999 approval of Dr. Miles's
application and its September 13 issuance of the policy, which was
picked up by Dr. Miles on October 5, 1999, after Dr. Miles had experienced symptoms in early October and had been seen by Dr. Cohen, who
diagnosed melanoma
on October 4.271 "The Court must enforce the
27 2
policy as written."
In Nash v. Ohio National Life Insurance Co.,273 the court of appeals
rejected another attempt at an exception to the duty to read responsibly.
In Nash a sophisticated insured, advised by an accountant over a
number of years, could not blame his agent for the consequences of not
reading his own variable life policy. 27 4 Wright Body Works v. Columbus
Interstate Insurance Agency 275 established the principle of acknowledg-

264. Id. at 906, 590 S.E.2d at 167.
265. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Castro, 341 F.2d 882 (1st Cir. 1965); TransAmerica
Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Miles, 317 F. Supp. 2d 1373 (N.D. Ga. 2003); Bogard v. InterState Assurance Co., 263 Ga. App. 767, 589 S.E.2d 317 (2003).
266. 263 Ga. App. 767, 589 S.E.2d 317 (2003).
267. Id. at 768, 589 S.E.2d at 318.
268. Id. at 769, 589 S.E.2d at 319 (citing Travelers Ins. Co. v. Castro, 341 F.2d 882, 884
(1st Cir. 1965) (emphasis omitted)).
269. 317 F. Supp. 2d 1373 (N.D. Ga. 2003).
270. Id. at 1378.
271. Id. at 1375-76.
272. Id. at 1379.
273. 266 Ga. App. 416, 597 S.E.2d 512 (2004).
274. Id. at 419-20, 597 S.E.2d at 516-17.
275. 233 Ga. 268, 210 S.E.2d 801 (1974).
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ing the responsibility of an agent to minutely examine nuances in the
policy and advise the insured, who relies on such an agent.27 6 The
insured's attempt to avoid the consequences of his own omission was
rejected by the court for the following reasons: the passage of over a
decade, the business sophistication of the alleged victim, the insured's
accountant's own counseling, and the understandability of the policy that
had been in his hands. The Georgia Supreme Court, in Printis v.
Bankers Life Insurance Co.,277 allowed the finance charge to be included with the principal in ascertaining the credit life insurance premium
on gross balance decreasing term coverage.278 Decisions referenced in
this paragraph consistently reflect enforcement of the terms of life
insurance, as written.
When life insurance was regulated by federal law, results were
similar. In an apparent hope that a different set of laws might yield a
different result, the issue of "undue influence" under the Serviceman's
279
Group Life Insurance program was litigated in Coursey v. Pudda.
although uncertain whether the federal "undue
Judge Alaimo,'
influence" law or the Georgia version applied, was certain that both laws
require some proof, as opposed to mere accusation, of undue influence. 21' There was none in the record. In Liberty Life Assurance Co.
v. Kennedy,' 2 the court held that, despite the apparent equities
between the successive spouses, the Employee Retirement Income
Secuity Act ("ERISA")2 1 could not be used to remedy the social
situation.2 4
The insureds did get a glimmer of hope from the Eleventh Circuit in
Jones v. American General Life & Accident Insurance Co., 285 wherein
the Eleventh Circuit allowed, under ERISA, equitable estoppel under
section 502(a)(1)(B),288 though the text of the insurance program was
insufficient to afford a remedy to the insureds.2 7 After repeated
promises of free lifetime group coverage from the predecessor, Indepen-

276. Id. at 271, 210 S.E.2d at 803.
277. 276 Ga. 697, 583 S.E.2d 22 (2003).
278. Id. at 700, 583 S.E.2d at 25.
279. 299 F. Supp. 2d 1368 (S.D. Ga. 2004).
280. Tinsley v. Gen. Motors Corp., 227 F.3d 700, 704 (6th Cir. 2000).
281. Coursey, 299 F. Supp. 2d at 1371.
282. 358 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2004).
283. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
284. Kennedy, 358 F.3d at 1300.
285. 370 F.3d 1065 (2004).
286. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)

(B) (2000).
287. Jones, 370 F.3d at 1066-67.
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dent Life, and continued representations by the successor, American
General, the retirement group was terminated in 2000.

